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ThefolIowinB edited ucrrpt, dmwnfom 'The Confrontation
chiuse &-Rooted and ~aNformed,"ZW3-04Cato Supreme Court
Review 439 (2004). b
y Law School PIofsor Richard D.Friedman,
and questions deneraed bg. the US.Supreme
divusses the impact,
Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington lastyear that a defemddnt
is entitled to confront and cross-examine any testimonial statement
presented =pi& him. In Crawford. the dcfmdant, chargad with
attuckin8 another man with a w e , contested the trial cow's admission
o f a tape-recorded statemmt his wife made to police without giving him
the opportunity to cross~examine.The trial court admitted the statement,
and the appeals court upheld ghe conviction.
When Crawford was argued before the US.Supreme Court in
November 200.3, the guiding rinci le or two decades had been that
f' P f
"the U.S. Supreme Court has tolerated admission of out-of-court statements against the accused, without cross-examination,fi the xtateamts
are deemed 'reliable' or 'trustworthy,"'accordin~to Friedman. But in
Crawford,"the Supreme Court did a sharp aboutIface,holding that
a 'testimoni~l'statementcannot be admitted against an accmed, no
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mutter how relidble a murt rnoy deem it to be, d e s 3 the a c m d Bas
had an adequate opportunity to c4&-examinr the aitnrrr who nitzde &he
statemeht ."
'Where rn~ntestimonialbearsay is at issue, it is whofly c~wi.stant
with the Framers' design to a J d the statesJlw;i&lity in their dewlipment ofhearsay law -as docr ~obcr&[Robertsv. Ohio, 4 8 US.
56 (1 9&0)],and as would an appz~achthat exempted such statements
from confrontation aauor scrutiny altofldher,'~u&ceAntopa Scalia
wrotefor the Court in g a w f o r d . "Where testimonial evidence is cd issue,
howeverIthe Sixth Amendment demands wha the common law ~hqutired:
unavailpbility and a prior opportunipfBr cross-examjna3tion. we lonvr
for another day any effort to spell out a c~mpmhemived@niition fc
'tatimonial.'"
"Crawford is not only Q vindication ofthc righu $the accused, but
a victoIYf.rjdelity t constitutional text and-intent:~riedmen writes
5
in the articlefrom which this excerpt is taken. 4Andyct the decjsim - '
leaves many open questions, and ell lawyers involved in the aimi'aal
ju&ce process will have ro adjust to the new regjme &at it creates.*

By Richard D. Friedman
Crar+rcI

States v. Orvens [484 U.S. 554 (1988)], a case involving a witness

reflects a paradigm shift in the doctrine of the

Confi-ontation Clause. Nonetheless, Crawfird and amici went to
some pains t o assure the Supreme Court that adoption of the
testimonial approacl~woultl alter the results in few, if an): of the
Court's own

precedents. A considerable

nunlber of decisioils in

the lower courts, however, would come out differently under
Crabrford. To set the groundwork for understanding how Crarford

alters the doctrinal landscape and the important issues that are
likely to arise, it will first help to examine several respects in
which C r a ~ f o r ddoes not change the law.

First, under Crarrford, as before, a statement does not raise
a confi-ontation issue unless it is offered to prove the truth of
a matter that it asserts. This is the rule of Tennessee I/.Street [47 1
U.S. 409, 414 (1985)], which C r a ~ f o r dexplicitly reaffirms.
In Street itself, for example, the defendant contended that the
~ o l i c ecoerced him to make a statement similar t o that of an
accon~plice'sconfession.The Court ruled unanimously that the
prosecution therefore could introduce the accomplice's confession
to demonstrate not that it was true but that it was substantially
different from the defendant's. That result would be unchanged

whose severe head injuries destroyed much of his memory - and
it now becomes more iinportant than ever for prosecutors. If a
witness makes a statement favorable t o a prosecutor, but the prosecutor is afraid that the witness will not stand by the statement
at trial, the prosecutor should not argue that the statement is
"reliable." Rather, the prosecutor should bring the witness t o
trial, o r otherwise ensure that the deSendant has had an adequate
opportunity for cross. If the witness reaffirms the substance of
the prior statement, all is well and good for the prosecutol-. If she
testifies at variance from the statement, then the Confrontation
Clause does not bar admissibility of the statement.

Fourth, in applying Roberts, the C o u r t developed a body
of case law concerning what constitutes proof of unavailability
(assuming the given statement can be introduced only if the
declarant is unavailable), and that case law - including part
of Roberts itself -is left untouched, for better or worse. At
argument in Cra~rford,the chief justice asked what impact the
testimonial approach nlould have on ~k[ancusiI-.Stubbs [40S U.S.
204 ( 1 972)], a key case in t h s line and one in which he wrote the
majority opinion.The proper answer is simple: None at all.

Fifth, Cramford explicitly preserves the principle that the

under Crarford. There may be questions as t o how far a prosecutor
may take this "not for the truth" argument. For example, if t l ~ e
prosecutor argues that the statement is being offered as support

accused should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation
right if the accused's oxvn misconduct prevented h m from ha\-ing

for tile opiilion of an expert witness, in solne cases that might

an adequate o p p o r t u n i h to cross-examine the witness. The right

be considered too t l i n a veneer. Nonetheless, the basic doctrine
remains in place.

may be forfeited, for example, if the accused murdered or inti~lli-

Second, many statements that were admissible under Roberts
will still be adnlissible under Crarford, thougll the grounds of
decision will be different. The question is not, as some analysts

dated the

17

ltness The forfeltul-e prlnc~plemay take on greater

Importance under Crai~Jord,as expla~nedbelon

Sixth, the rule of !llarl,land I Cralg [497 U .S S 36 ( 1990)] 1s
ul1changed, at least for no]? In that case, the Court held that,

d
given hearsay excephave posed it, 11-hether C r a ~ ~ f o rpreserves

upon a particularized sho\\ing that a child witness would be

tions. The rule against hearsay and the Confrontatioi~Clause are
separate sources of lam7 - and Crarrford stops the tendenc) t o

traumatized by testifying in the presence of the accused, the child
may testify in another room, ~ v i t tlle
l ~ judge and counsel present

meld them. The question for Confrontation Clause purposes in

but tlle jury and the accused connected electi-onically. Crar~ford

each case is whether the given statement is testimonial. The fact

addresses the question of when conkontation is required; Craig

that a statement fits \vithin a hearsay esception does not alter its
status ~ v i t hrespect to that question.

The two cases can coexist peacefully, and nothing in Cra~rford

But one can say that most statements that fit xvithin certain
,
hearsay exceptions are not testimonial. For e s a n ~ p l eunder
Roberts, business records and conspirator statements were deemed

addresses the question of what procedures coilfrontation requires.
suggests that Cralg is placed in doubt. And yet, Justice Scalia
dissented bitterly in C r a g . The categorical nature of lus opinion
in Crorrjird squares better \!-it11 lGs Craig d s s e n t than x v i t l ~Justice

reliable because they fell within "firmly rooted" hearsay esemp-

O'Connor's looser majority opinion in Craig, and presunlably he

tions. Under Crairford, almost all such statements v i l l be considered non-testimonial, and therefore the Confrontation Clause \\rill

would TI-elcornethe opportunity t o o x r r u l e Craig. Whether he
~ v o u l dhave the votes is an open question.

i m p o x little, if any, obstacle to tlleir admissibility.

Finally, Crar~fordleaves intact the final succor of prosecutors, the rule that a violation of the confrontation right may be

Third, the rule of Calfornia r7.Green [399 U.S. 149 (1970)l
As tile Crarrford Court sumn~arizedtlle rule,

also is

" [Wlhen the declarant appears for cross-esan~inationat trial, the

ConSrontation Clause places no constraints at all on die use of his
prior testinloilia1 statements."
In my vie\v, the rule is a dubious one. It fails to talze into
account the serious impairment of the ability to cross-examine

l~armlessand therefore not require reversal.

Changes and open questions
That Craiiford leaves much of the status quo ante unchanged
does not gainsay that it changes a great deal, and not just the
conceptual framework of the Confrontation Clause. Here I TI-ill

that arises when a witness' prior statement is ad~nittedand the

address respects in ~ v h i c hCmnford does change the la\\; questions

witness does not re-assert its substance, effectively \valhng away

that it leaves open, and adjustnle~ltst o existing law that might be

from it. But the Court has sho\~,n110 inclination to modify the

adopted in its walte.

rule. Indeed, ~t was reinforced 11)1Justice Scal~ahimself in U n ~ t c d
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A. The basic change
Most fuundan~entally,of course, Crar~j'ordends the prosecuterial use of testi~nonialstatements made to police in circumstances
\\.here the accuscd cannot confl-ont his accuser. That n ~ e a n sthat
\vhen a prosecutor attempts to introduce a testinloilia1 statement
made by a person \vho is not a ~vitnessat trial, the prosecutor
will not be able t o argue that the statenlent should be admitted
because it is reliable. Unless the accused either has had the opportunity t o cross-examine the declarant, or has forfeited the right t o
confront her, the statement cannot be admitted.
Thus, t o take an obvious example, some courts have been
willing t o admit grand jury testimony given by a witness who is
n o t available at trial, persuading themselves that various factors
-including
- are

the fact that the testimony was given under oath

in the aggregate sufficiently strong "particularized guaran-

tees of trust\vorttuness" t o excuse the absence of an opportunity
for cross-examination. Cra~rfordmeans that this practice must
stop. Similarly, station-house statements, of the type involved in

Crarfford itself, and statements made in plea hearings may not be
introduced by the prosecution unless either the witness testifies at
trial o r she is unavailable and the accused has had an opportunity
t o cl-oss-examine her. Courts have already begun t o apply cases
consistently \vith these principles. In one Detroit murder case
pending o n appeal when Crarrford was decided, the prosecutor has
since confessed error, because the conviction depended in part
on statements made t o a polygraph examiner by a friend of the
accused. Consider also United States r< Saner [3 1 3 F. Supp. 2d 596
(S.D. Ind. 2004)], a post-Craarford decision in n ~ l i c hthe accused,
a bookstore manager, objected t o admission of a statement by a
competitor, made t o a Justice Department lawyer and paralegal,
that the t\vo managers had fixed prices. The Court held, properly,
that because the accused had not had a chance t o cross-examine
the competitor, who asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege
at trial, Crar~fordprecluded admissibility of the competitor's
statement.

B. The meaning of "testimonial"
The most significant question that arises, of course, is how far
the category of "testimonial" statements extends.

1. Standards
The Cra~rfordCourt did not have difficulty in concluding that

"EX parte in-court testimony or its f ~ ~ n c t i o nequivalent
al
- that
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior

testimony that the defendant was unablc to cross-examine, or
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially";
"Estrajuclicial statements

. . . contained in forlnalized testimo-

nial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions" ; and
"Staten~entsthat were made under circulllstances which
\vould lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial."
I believe the t l i r d of these is the inost useful and accurate.
It captures the animating idea behind the Confrontation Clause
-the

prevention of a system in which witnesses can offer their

testimony in private without cross-examination. In some cases,
under this vie\\: a statement should be considered testinlonial
even though it was not made to a government official.
l
It is by no means certain that this standard n ~ i l ultimately
prevail. Some language in Crarrford emphasizes the role of government officers in creating testimony. For example, having used
the t e r m "interrogation," the Court takes care to note that
Sylvia's statement, "knowingly given in response t o structured
police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition"; at
another point, it noted that "[ilnvolvement of government officers
in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents
unique potential for prosecutorial abuse." This emphasis o n
qovernment involvement might suggest that the Court will stick
closely t o a minimalist definition of testimonial statements.
That would be a mistake, however. I do not believe that
participation by government officials in creation of the statement
- either receipt of it as its initial audience or active procurement of it through interrogation -is the essence of what makes a
statement testimonial.
The confrontation right was recognized in older systems
in which there was no public prosecutor, and victims or their
families prosecuted crimes themselves. The idea behind the
confrontation right is that the judicial system cannot try an
accused with the aid of testimony by a witness whom the accused
has not had a chance to confi-ont.The prosecutor plays no essential
role in the violation.
Thus, if just before trial a person shoved a written statement

"Statements taken by police officers in the course of interroga-

under the courthouse door, asserting that the accused did in fact
commit the crime, that ~ v o u l dplainly be testimonial even though

tions," as Syl\:ials \vas, are "testimonial under even a narrow

n o government official played a role in preparing the statement.

standard." As the C o u r t elaborated:
"Whatever else the t e r m covers, it applies at a minimum t o

that one of the statements involved in the notorious Raleigll case

prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,

Sylvia's [the defendant's spouse's] statement was testimonial:

One ground for hope in this respect is that Crarriford itself noted

o r at a former trial; and t o police interrogations. These are the

was a letter.
In some cases a problem that nearly is the remrse arises - an

rnodern practices ~ v i t hclosest kinship t o the abuses at which the

investigative official may be seehng t o procure evidence, but

Confrontation Clause was directed."

the declarant may not understand this. I believe that in the usual

So much for the core. The boundaries o f t h e category will

case the investigator's anticipation should not alter characteriza-

have t o be marked out by future cases. The Court quoted three

tion of the statement. If the declarant does not recognize she is

standards nrithout choosing among them:

creating evidence that may be used in a criminal proceeding, then
the nature of what she is doing in making the statement is not
testimonial.
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Thus, a conversation between criiiiinal confederates, with no
anticipation of a leak to the authorities, is not ordinarily testinio-

Consider, for example, State v. Davis [64 P. 3d 661 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2003)], now o n review in the Washington Supreme C o u r t

nial, and if in fact the authorities are surreptitiously recording

(the same court from w h c h Crabford came). The complainant

the conversation, that shoultl not change thc result. O n the other

called 91 1 and, in response t o questions by the operator, disclosed

hand, investigators probably should not be allowed t o disguise

lus fists and then r u n out
that tlie defendant had beaten her ~,vith

that is, for the purpose of defeating

the door, further disclosed that she had a protection order against

tlie confrontation right. Accordingly, even apart from a standard

him, and explained the reasons why he had been in her house. The

their intcnt gratuitously

-

lilce the third one quoted above, perhaps a statement should

complainant did not testify at trial, and the 91 1 tape was played t o

be considered testimonial in mihat might be called an "invited
statement" context in which the statement fits a description such
as this:

the jury. In closing argument, the prosecutor said, "[A]lthough she

Before the statemenr is made, ( I ) a recipient o f t h e slaternent anticipates erfidentiaiy use $the statement, but does not jnform the declarant o f

is not here today t o talk t o you[,] she left something better. She
left you her testimony o n the day tliat this happened . . . . [Tlhis
sho~osthat the defendant, Adrian Davis, was at her home and
assaulted her."

this anticipation, and (2) the prosecution does not demonstrate that disclo-

Then the prosecutor played the 91 1 tape again. Here, the

su1.e $anticipation $er/identiaiy use ~ i ~ o u have
l d substantialb diminished

statement has strong claim to be considered testimonial. Davis

the probability that the declarant would have made the statement.

The idea behind tlie second prong of sucli a test would be that
if disclosing the recipient's investigatory activity would not inhibit

and cases like it suggest that the 9 1 1 -call scenario should not
be dismissed by broad generalizations about the "typical" case.
Rather, a case-by-case assessment is necessary. Indeed, even if a

tlie declarant from inaking the statement, then the disclosure

91 1 call is nothing but an urgent plea for protection, the court

probably ought to be made; on the other hand, if the disclosure
would likely prevent the stateinent from being niade, then the

should closely scrutiilize it. I \\;ill repeat here the analysis that

investigator has sufficient reason for declining t o make a disclo-

Bridget McCorinack [Law School Associate Dean for Clinical
Affairs] and I h a w given:

sure.This rule seems to m e to have some merit, but it may be too
complicated to be applied satisfactorily.

the fact of the call presumably should be admitted so the prosecu-

"To the extent the call itself is part of the incident being tried,
tion can present a coherent story about the incident. But even

2. Special cases
Many cases will arise, in a wide variety of circumstances,
in which it is a close question whether a statement should be
deemed testimonial. I will address here two of the most important
recurring types of cases.

in that situation, t l ~ eneed to present a coherent story does not
necessarily justify admitting the contents of the call. And even if
the circumstances d o warrant allowing the prosecution t o prove
the contents of the call, those contents generally should not be
admitted t o prove the truth of \{-hat they assert . . . .To the extent

a. When are 91 1 calls testimonial?
Consider first the example of statements made in calls to 91 1
operators. In recent years, courts have often admitted these statements - most characteristically, by coniplainants in doniestic
violence cases - even though the caller has not testified in
court. Under Crarrj'ord, this practice \vould not be allorved if the
statenient is deemed "testin~onial."Theextent to xvhich these calls
are "testimonial," hove\.er, is an open question.

that the contents of the call are significant only as the caller's
report of \\,hat has happened, such a report usually should be
considered testimonial."

b. When are statements by children "testimonial"?
Another ~ p ofe case &at frequently will test the limits of the
tern1 "testimonial" involves statements by children, typically
alleging some kind of abuse. Suppose, for example, a young child

case [People I: /I4oscar, 777 N.Y.S.
The court in one post-C~-ar~j'orrl
2d 875 (N.Y.
Criin. C t . 2004)], in justifying its decision tliat state-

tells a police officer that an adult has physically o r sexually abused

ments in 91 1 calls should not be deeined testimonial, declared:

monial. But can a different result occur in tlle case of a 1-er? young

"Typically, a wornan \vho calls 9 1 1 for help because she has
just been stabbed or shot is not contenlplatiiig being a '\vitness' in
future legal

she is usually trying simply to save her

her. If an adult made sucli a statement, it I\-ould clearly be testichild?
At some point, the statement of a very young child may
perhaps be considered more like the bark of a bloodhound than

o ~ v nlife."

like the testimony of an adult human; that is, tlie child may be

This generalization fits some cases, but not all. In some cases,
tlie caller docs not perceive tliat she is any longcr in immediate

Ivith n o
reacting to and colninunicating about what occ~u-I-ed,

danger, and the primar)r purpose of the call is simply to initiate

Arguably, fidelity to the text and policies of the Confrontation

sense of the consequences that her communication may ha\-e.

investigative and prosecutorial machinery. Indeed, often the call

Clause suggests that some degree of understanding of the conse-

occurs a considerable time after the particular episode has closed,

quences of the statement is necessary before a declarailt may

and often tlie caller gives a good deal of illformation that is not

be considered a "xvitness." If that is true, the better rule \vould

necessary Lor immediate intervention. In a broader set of cases,
at
the caller's motives are mixed but she is Lully aware tliat ~ v l ~she

probably be that a person is not a \.\;itness uldcss she understands

says has potential evidentiary value.

tliat tlie statement, if accepted, is likely t o lead t o adverse consequei~cesforthe person accused. Under this vie\\;, a child could
be a ~ i t n e s even
s
if she had n o real understandillg of the legal

LQN Winter 2005
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svstem; it \vould be enough t o k n o ~ \that
- telling a police officer
about a bad thing that a person did would likely cause that person
t o be punished.
I11

3. What constitutes an "opportunity for cross-examination"?
Under Crorrford, the confi-ontation right presumptively is
violated if a statenlent is considered "testimonial" but the \vitness

deciding whether a child is capable of acting as a "w.itness,"

does not testify at trial. By contrast, the confi-ontation right is not

the ~ n o r a as
l \\.ell as cognitive development of the child may well

violated where the witness is unavailable and the accused has had a

be material. My colleague [U-h4 La\$-School Professor] Sllerinan

prior opportunity for cross-examination. I11 the wal<e of Cro~rford,

Clark has argued that part of what drives the confrontation right

a \vise prosecutor, aware of the possibility that a key witness may

is not siinply the formal categorization of a person as a "witness,"

be unavailable, will often take the witness's deposition early in

but also the moral sense of the obligation of an accuser t o confront

the investigation. Crorrford therefore raises an important question

the accused. If he is right

-

and I believe there is a good deal of

force t o the argument -then the inlportant question is not only
~ v h e t h e rthe child understands the punitive consequences of the

about what constitutes an adequate "prior opportunity for crossexamination."
For example, suppose a laboratory report is a critical piece of

statement, but also "the level of obligation and responsibility we

evidence. In most circumstances, the lab report should be consid-

are 11-illingt o put o n the shoulders of children."

ered testimonial, because the report is prepared in anticipation of
its introduction at trial. Therefore, the lab teclmician who made

Even assuming a given child is capable of making a testimonial statement, the fact that the declarant is a child can compli-

the report should testify at trial if she is available to do so. If she

~ e rparticular stateinent should be
cate the question of > ~ ~ h e t lthe

becomes unavailable through n o fault of the accused (by accidental

deemed testimonial. As I suggested earlier, when an adult makes

death, for example), and the accused has not had an opportunity

a statement accusing a person of a crime, the statement should

t o cross-esamine her, then the report should not be considered

be considered testimonial, even though the statement is made t o

admissible.

a private individual, if the declarant understands that the listener
will pass the information on t o the authorities. But consider

But Lf the prosecution takes her deposition - that is, a pretrial
examination, subject t o oath and cross-esamination - and the

children's statements t o interi~lediaries-for instance, a child's

technician later becomes unavailable, the prosecutor may use the

statement t o h s mother. This situation may be materially l f f e r e n t

deposition if the deposition presented an adequate opportunity

from that of the adult witness, because even a child sufficiently

for cross-examination.

mature t o b e capable of being considered a witness may have no

Because Cratford increases the prosecutor's incentive to take a

understanding that the third party will pass the statement o n t o

deposition, Tve can expect pressure to amend the rules of criminal

the authorities.
There are different ways t o approach this problem. O n e view

procedure in jurisdictions, including at the federal level, in which
depositions are not now readily available, and perhaps even to

is that the statement is not testimonial if a chdd in the position of

allow depositions before charges have been brought. If a deposi-

the declarant would not understand that the information I+-ould
reach the authorities. A second ~ i e w
is that if the child, n i t h o u t

tion is taken very early, obviously there will often be a question
whether it gave the accused an adequate opportunity to cross-

understanding the particulars, expects the mother t o visit adverse

examine. Did counsel have enough time t o prepare? Did counsel

consequences upon the assailant, then the child should be deemed

know what issues t o press, and have the information at hand that

t o be testifying xzithin his or her ability t o d o so. And a third view

would enable her to do so effectively?The better approach ~ v o u l d

is that differentiating by maturity is simply inappropriate and

not be t o assunle that early opportu~litiesare inadequate per se;

uladministrable, so the perspective of a reasonable adult should
goyern determination of whether a statement is deemed testimo-

in many cases, counsel will have little difficulty, even with limited
preparation and eve11 before matters h a x proceeded very far,

nial.

determining what questions to ask. Rather, if the defendant had

Furthermore, the supplemental standard I have suggested as

an opportunity t o cross-examine the witness at deposition but the

a possibility in "invited statement" contexts may be appropriate

witness is unavailable at trial, the confrontation right should not

in certain cases involving statements by children. Under that

require exclusion unless the defense shows some particular reason
to believe the opportunity was inadequate.

standard, the stateinent should be deemed testimonial (1) if the
is withheld from the c h l d
investigative nature of the con~~ersation

One more change in prosecutorial practice lnay well follow

but (2) it does not appear that the nondisclosure was necessary

from Cranford. Suppose a prosecutor announces an intention

t o procure the statement. Again, the idea is that the investigator

t o use a witness' statement and invites the defense t o demand
a deposition of the witness if it wants to be assured of cross-

should not be allo~vedt o withhold the purposes of her inquiries
qratuitously in an effort to defeat the confrontation right -but

examining the witness. If the defendant does not make the

the complexity of this inquiry gives m e some qualms whether this
standard should be applied.

demand, the witness is unavailable at trial, and the prosecution

L

offers the statement, would this procedure suffice t o protect

Plainly, this is an extraordinarily complex and dimcult area,

adequately the "opportunity for confi-ontation"?Perhaps, by not

and pending further guidance from the Court it will remain vel-y

making the demand though bcing warned of the possible conse-

uncertain.

quences, the defendant would be deemed to have waived thc
co~lfrontationI-ight. O r perhaps the
~irouldbe consid-
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ered a violation of the accused's passive right t o d o nothing and

is that the accused has acted wrongfully in a way that is incom-

"be confronted with" the witnesses against him. We may never

patible with maintenance of the right. Suppose that a11 informer

kllo~vfor sure unless the procedure is tried.

makes a statement t o the police describing a drug kingpin's illegal

4. What constitutes "forfeiture"?
The idea that the accused cannot claim the confrontation right
if the accused's own misconduct prevents the witness from testifying at trial is a very old one. Cracrfoord explicitly reaffirms it, and
justifiably so.
Forfeiture often raises difficult issues. If a witness is murdered
shortly before she was scheduled to testify against the accused,
what sho\ving of the accused's involvement does the prosecution have to make? Is it enough that the accused acquiesced in
the wrongdoing? And h o ~ vis participation or acquiescence t o be
determined; 1s the mere fact that the accused benefited froin the
murder enough to raise a presumption that the accused acquiesced
in it?
One issue on \vhicl~Crarrford gives little o r n o guidance may
be expected to become particularly pressing now. Suppose the
wrongful act that allegedly rendered the witness unavailable is the
same act \vitI~~vhichhe is charged. May the act nevertheless cause
a forfeiture of the confrontation right? For example, suppose the
accusation is of child sexual abuse and the prosecution argues
that the abuse itself has intimidated the child from testifying in
court (though she previously made a statement describing it). O r
suppose the accusation is of murder, the prosecution contending
that the accused struck a fatal b l o ~ vand that the victim made a
statement identifying the accused and then died?
The first reaction of many observers is that in such situations
forfeiture would be bizarre. And yet, for reasons I will sunlmarize
briefly, I believe that in some circumstances it is appropriate.
In post-Cracrford cases, txvo state supreme courts [Colorado and
Kansas] have agreed.
The objection most frequently made to applying forfeiture
doctrine in situations of this sort is that it is bootstrapping: The
accused is held to have forfeited the confrontation right on the

activities. But the informer stays undercover and, before the
kingpin knows anything about the statement, the two get into a
fight over a card game. The kingpin goes t o a closet, pulls out a
gun, and inurders the informer. If the lungpin is tried on drug
charges and the prosecution wants to introduce the informer's
statement, the kingpin should not succeed in arguing, "But I
haven't had a chance t o cross-examine him." The appropriate
response is, "And whose fault is that?You murdered him."
As interpreted in this way, forfeiture doctrine can solve one
of the puzzles of the confrontation right.The Craufoord Court
accurately noted that the "dylng declaration" exception is the only
exception commonly applicable t o testimonial statements that
had been well established at the time of the Sixth Amendment's
adoption in 179 1 . The Court then said, with apparently studied
ambiguity, "If this exception must be accepted on historical
grounds, it is sui p e r i s . " It seems highly unlikely that the C o u r t
~ v o u l dgenerally exclude statements that fit within the dying
declaration exception, thus achieving a remarkably unappealing
evidentiary result that courts have avoided for several h ~ n d r e d
years.
O n the other hand, admitting these statements o n the ground
suggested by the Court raises problems of its o\vn. It obscures t l ~ e
clarity of the principle adopted by Crarford, that if a statement is
testimonial it cannot be introduced against the accused unless lie
had an opportunity to cross-esamine the ~vitness.And it does so
o n very \veak grounds, for (as noted above) the rationale general1)cited for the dying declaration exception is absurd. A far better
resolution would be t o r e c o p z e that, however the admissibility of dying declarations usually has been defended, it really is
e
that a defendant
best understood as a reflection of d ~ principle
~ ~ renders
h o a ~ ~ i t n eunavailable
ss
by \\.rongful means cannot
complain about her absence at trial. That principle also explains,
incidentally, \vhy ( 1 ) the hearsay exceptiorl for dying declarations

ground that he or she committed the very act o n rvlIich the trial
centers - an act that he or she is accused of committing, but

is limited to those that describe the cause of deatll, and

denies collnnitting and is presuined not to have committed. O n

declaration ill not be admitted unless death appeared irrlininent

closer analysis, I do not believe tlle objection carries weight.

at tlle time the declaration was made.

Tlle situation is analogous to the one that often arises \!.hen a

C. Crawfords impact on non-testimonial statements

defendant is accused of conspiracy and the prosecution argues that
the hearsay rule poses no bar to ad~nissionof a statement made by

(2) the

a conspirator in support of the conspiracy. In each of these cases,

If a statenlent is deemed not t o be testinlonial, \vhat is t l ~ e
impact of the Conkontation Clause? Cra~ford does not resolve the

the same factual issue - tlle defendant's participation in the

matter. The tlleory of the opinion suggests, and the C o u r t explic-

conspiracy in the one case, and his co~ninissionof the n-rongful
act that rendered the witness ~u~available
in the other -may
arise as a tl~resholdmatter for evidentiary purposes and when

itly preserves the possibility of, "an approach that exempted such

determining guilt, but so ~~rllat?Tlle
issue will likely be decided for
the two different purposes by difrerent fact-finders - the judge

statenlents fi-on1 Confrontatioil Clause scrutiny altogether." But,
in an apparent compromise, the Court also indicated tllat Roberts,
or some standard even more flexible, might also be applied in

deciding tl~l-esholdevidentiary matters and the jury deterinining

this context. Nuinerous post-Crar~jirdcourts, haying determined
the statements at issue were not testimonial, haye gone t l ~ r o u g l ~

guilt

the Roberts analysis and -not surprisiugly

-

and on different factual bases.

-determilled

that

Another objection is that presumably the crinle \\.as not
committed for the purpose of rendering the witness unavailable.

thc statelnents were admissible. It is easy enough t o see \\-l1y a

But again I respond \vith a shrug. The point of forfeiture doctrine

If instcad the court held that the Confi-ontation Clause did not

ld
this approach:
court disposed to admit a statement ~ ~ o ufollo-\\.
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applv at all to non-testimonial ctatemcnts, it might leave itsclf
vulnerable to rcversal if a hisher court held that Rohcrtv continues
t o apply t o such a statcment. So it is prudent t o run through thc
Roherts analysis, M-hicha court can a11va1.s find is satisfied if it \\.ants

t o (that being one of the problems 11-ithRohcrrs.) No terrible harm
is done, perhaps, but the process is n~asteful,bccause courts \\.ill
continue to run through it 11-ithpredictable results. Until a prosecutor is brave enough to press the point, it is doubtful that thcre
\[-ill be a clear test in the Supreme Court on the proposition that
outside thc contest of testimonial statements, the Confrontation
Clause has no force.

Conclusion
Plainly, Cran.ford leaves open many very important questions.
In particular, the impact of the opinion may be very different
depending on whether the Supreme Court adopts a broad or
narrow undci-standing of the term "testimonial ." But li-hat is most
important is that the jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause,
aftcr a long detour, has been set on the proper course. This means
that the discourse can be rational and candid. Rather than manipulating unans\serablc questions as to whether a given statement
is sufficiently "reliable" to warrant admission, the courts will be
asking \i-hether admission violates the time-honored and constitutionally protected right of a criminal defendant to insist witnesses
against him testify subject to cross-examination.
Even in the pages of this journal, I am willing t o confess that I
am not a strict originalist in constitutional interpretation. I believe
that there are some questions of constitutional law that cannot
be anslsered most usefull!. by asking lshat the public meaning
\\-as of the constitutional test at the time it \vas adopted, or what
the intention of the Framers was. But in this contest, all indications are in alignment. The historical background shoxss that the
meaning of the text and the intention of the Framers are quite
clcar, and the unequivocal procedural rule on which they insisted
continues to resonate today as one of the ccntral aspects of our
svstem of criminal procedure. The Crartford Court properly
said, "By replacing catcgorical constitutional guarantees with
open-endcd balancing tcsts, \r-e do violence to their design." The
Constitution does not always speak in terms of categorical guarantees, but \vhcn it does, as in the case of the Confrontation Clause,
it should be heeded. Give credit t o the Court for disenthralling
itsclf from a doctrine that had grown familiar but had no basis in
thc Constitution and was utterl!. unsatisfactory, and for recognizing the essence of thc confrontation right.
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